Abstract: The idea of civil society is one of the oldest and most contested in Western political and sociological thought. Among the social sciences, anthropology has been the discipline that has prompted the boldest critiques of the concept. This paper argues that the "revival" of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe in one particular field-that of environmental activism-has been contingent with the outcomes of EU enlargement policies. I introduce the case study of one of the most complex and contested transport development projects in Central Eastern Europe: the Budapest Ring Road. I maintain that within the EU enlargement project alternative forms of political power have been built from below and that they eventually come to compete with the state (and local governments) to influence decision-making processes. These forms, to be individuated in the emergence of environmental activism, take shape at local, state and transnational levels and aim, although often contradictorily, at restituting political agency under the condition of lowering public participation in decision-making processes.
The idea of civil society is one of the oldest and most contested in Western political and sociological thought. Among the social sciences, anthropology has been the discipline that has prompted the boldest critiques of the concept from a number of methodological perspectives, accounting for the different area specialisations of the scholars. Civil society is ideally defined as a "category that describes and envisages a complex and dynamic ensemble of legally protected non-governmental institutions that tend to be non-violent, self-organising, self-reflexive and permanently in tension with each other and with state institutions that 'frame', constrict and enable their activities" (Keane 1998, 6) . The complexity of the definition closely reflects the wide spectrum of (social and political) activities that it encompasses as well as the difficulty of classifying the domains and arenas of these activities. Hence, the first criticism prompted by social anthropology concerned the application and even the usefulness of the notion of civil society: it is hard to define what it actually applies to.
The second criticism refers to the origins of the notion, located in a particular period (from the development of classical Greek and Latin philosophy onwards, to the Enlightenment period, the late eighteenth century and the consolidation of Marxian and Marxist thought), and in a particular place-Western Europe. The extremely rich philosophical body of literature on civil society in Western Europe alone suggests that anthropology can only play a marginal role in the development of a notion which, according to many of its original definitions, is abstract to non-western societies. The very idea of "civility", as suggested by Jack Goody, is extremely suspicious when it is not applied "to technical archaeology" (Goody 2001, 152) .
The third criticism, raised by Hann and Dunn (1996) and Comaroff and Comaroff (1999) , relates to the use of this notion in the social sciences and in applied research, where it may easily foster ethnocentrism. This might be manifest for instance in the discourse about the so-called "revival of civil society" (as indicated below) in regional settings such as Eastern European and Latin American countries. This position is, according to some anthropologists, tinged with exoticism, because such a revival implies that civil society becomes, as Goody proposes a "weapon of the weak" (Goody 2001, 153) , exported and later put aside by the "progressive West".
In spite of the several ambiguities relating to the historical development of the notion of civil society and even more so to its methodological testing in the study of contemporary social phenomena, there are some opportunities for its use. By applying the notion to a number of social, political and anti-political movements which have pursued similar and dissimilar goals, forms of protest, expressions of desires and anxieties in both Western and Eastern Europe, it is possible to create a common basis for empirical investigation and comparative analysis. This paper argues that the "revival" of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe, in a particular field, i.e. that of environmental activism, has been contingent with the outcomes of EU enlargement policies. I do not wish to argue against the anthropological criticisms regarding the use of this notion, particularly when applied to post-socialist transformation. I maintain that within the EU enlargement project alternative forms of political power have been built that eventually come to compete with the state (and local governments) to influence decision-making processes. This new civil society (the term is used emically, since most of the movements that have been studied call themselves "civic organizations" or "civil society movements") is global and pluralistic in terms of language and linkages, and is becoming the place where the state is demystified as the central locus of authority, emulated in its communication strategies and eventually reinterpreted as an entity with which negotiation can or cannot be sought.
The role of anthropology in theorising civil society
Anthropology has often hesitated to use the notion of civil society and to study it. There may be several reasons for this and some will be outlined here. The first is that there is no general agreement on the definition of the notion, which generates confusion and has led some anthropologists to challenge whether the notion is meaningful at all. The second reason has to do with the ethnocentrism inherent in the notion, which, taken uncritically, may breed opposition between "western civil" versus "non-western uncivil" society (Hann and Dunn 1996; Goody 2001; Junghans 2001) . Here anthropological unease is at its height, first because the common use of the notion derives from the western intellectual tradition and thus cuts out those regions on which the majority of anthropologists work.
The third reason concerns the methodological approach used in its study. Framed in the perspective of global transformation, civil society is usually adopted as a panacea for denouncing and fighting transnational "uncivil forces" such as criminality, corruption, poverty and environmental crimes (Schneider and Schneider 2001) . Studying civil society at a global level is highly contradictory and leaves the researcher who opts for this notion with the creeping doubt that the object of study is indefinable and as such cannot be confined to one single case study. To this one adds the difficulty of distinguishing between genuinely local civic movements, national non-governmental organisations and movements born under wider and diversified umbrella organisations (Hearn 2001) .
This differentiation calls for accurate and comprehensive methodologies for conducting fieldwork research, which trace the different and multiple local origins of these movements, the way they have changed over time, and the different strategies they adopt when confronting different institutional actors (citizens, state and local governments, NGOs, transnational political forces, the market, international organizations etc). The limits of anthropological fieldwork, or of participant observation, are manifest in attempts to study what has recently been called "global civil society".
The most complete and sophisticated theorisation of civil society in anthropology is the work by Ernest Gellner (1994) . The Jewish-Bohemian philosopher and social anthropologist started his enquiry into a notion that, he underlines, "all of a sudden has been taken out and thoroughly dusted, and has become a shining emblem" (1994, 1). He attributes this revitalisation not only to the "brutality" of the socialist regimes, but also to the recognition that Marxist theory had come to a dead end. Gellner argues against the inappropriateness of the standard definitions of civil society, which refer to "non-governmental institutions strong enough to counterbalance the state" in specifying the link with the modern concept of freedom. One example he uses is the case of segmentary societies which, although challenging, or presenting themselves as an alternative to, central power, nonetheless limit and control individual freedom (see also Goody 2001, 161-3) . His focus is not on civil society in the narrow sense of non-governmental organisations, but in the broader sense of social order. Thus he contrasts civil society with what he believed could not belong to the idea of civil society: preindustrial segmentary societies, Soviet communism, Islamic rule and other historical forms. By contrasting these notable examples of what civil society is not, Gellner is able to construct different and alternative definitions of the notion when, for instance, he argues that compared to Islam "civil society is an a-moral order" (1994, 137) , or "unlike communism it is the separation of [the polity from the economy], but with the economy not merely dependent but actually dominant, treating the polity as its accountable servant" (ibid., 205-6). "What is essential to [civil society] is the absence of either ideological or institutional monopoly: no one doctrine is elevated to sacredness and uniquely linked to the social order" (ibid., 188). His final answer to the initial question "why [did] civil society suddenly emerge into the light from obscurity?" is partly a reaction to communism, a monolithic form of social order which curtailed any form of independence.
One finds in Gellner's perspective a tension, unresolved for some (see Hann and Dunn's critique below) , between the particularism of anthropology's view and the universalism of the view that inscribes in civil society the struggle and resistance against a central totalitarian authority, in the Gramscian perspective. It would not be surprising to find that Gellner's most notable theoretical achievement is openness to interdisciplinary cross-fertilisation (see for instance Katz 2002) .
Jean and John Comaroff, in the introduction to their edited volume on civil society in Africa (1999), caution us about the multifaceted nature of the notion, which as "an allpurpose placeholder, … captures otherwise inchoate-as yet unnamed and unnameablepopular aspirations, moral concerns, sites and spaces of practices" (1999, 3) . For them civil society is an attempt to deal with "positive politics", reviving an old notion which is imbued with methodological confusion. This approach draws from the authors' initial reflections on a number of paradoxes, such as the point that revitalisation of the notion became, in some socio-political contexts, attached to "a populist strive for moral community and social being" against a background of intruding neoliberalism (1999, (3) (4) . This paradox has been pointed out by other authors, including non-anthropologists, who denounced unease with a notion that, while predicating the triumph of self-reflexive and pluralist movements beyond or beneath the influence of the state in the "western" world, tells us about resistance and insurgency against a violent re-occupying of these spaces by the neoliberal state in "nonwestern" contexts (see Hardt 1995; Keane 2003) .
The commonly detected epistemic problem seems to be that the civil society-state relationship can no longer be dealt with through the classical theoretical approaches on which the notion itself is grounded. The Hegelian/Marxist call for the need to bring into play economic relations and the market may still appear very timely, but it provides for an insufficient framework since political society is increasingly formed beyond the state. The Comaroffs argue that this happened in three ways: through the deconstruction of currencies and custom borders, the transnational flow of credits and mobile markets and the transnationalising trend of the division of labour and migration (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, 15) . Hence, within the eroding state all the areas attacked by the power of global capitalism would have developed a number of counter-phenomena (over)emphasising the production of cultural, social identities and local practices which challenge, or according to others, channel the violence of neoliberalism. In this perspective, the rise of civil society becomes yet another of those reactions to or reflections of the rule of global neoliberalism.
Chris Hann has made a similar point, but from a different angle (1996) . His view of the use of civil society stems from criticism of Gellner's approach, which he considers to be conducted through the eyes of a social philosopher and not an anthropologist (1996, 2) . In particular, taking as his model the post-socialist transformation in Eastern Europe, he considers the traditional western antagonism of state-society as a "futile" endeavour (1996, 9) . Using the same notion of civil society to back the "so called anti-political" dissident movements would be at odds with the real political character of the multiparty systems that developed after 1990. A general ambivalence prevails when attempting to apply civil society to describe the post-socialist transformation. This occurs for two reasons: on the one hand, contrary to what is usually assumed, socialism granted local citizens, especially in rural areas, venues of expression of their social identities, needs and aspirations which since the 1990s have gradually been damaged or lost forever (see also Torsello 2008) . The socialist state, as a number of anthropological studies have demonstrated, intruded into society, but also built a parallel "civil society" by supporting semiformal and informal networks, circles, associations, foundations, which were not necessarily of a political nature. These forms have in part been eradicated in the post-socialist transformation, in part they are used as matrixes on which to build new types of reasonably formalised civil society (see also Pine 2002; Kaneff 2004) .
On the other hand, civil society, after 1990, had definitively lost "the emotional slogan" of the late 1980s (Hann 1996, 10) . Hence, Hann concludes that the relationship between civil society and the state cannot be relevantly investigated with the notion of civil society, if this has come to be "equated crassly with the expansion of the 'non-governmental organisation' sector" (1999, 9) .
The criticisms by the Comaroffs' and Hann/Dunn suggest that there are two important points for reflection. The first is that in order for civil society to remain a useful and methodologically valid concept, it needs to be conceived of critically, as an outcome of the neoliberal state and of bottom-up forces reacting or adjusting to market and institutional pressures. The second is that anthropologists are wary of improper definitions of civil society used to cover a number of examples of formal to informal socio-political action (from religious to ethnic ties, interpersonal networks, unions, neighbours, social clubs, and so forth) which have been the traditional subjects of ethnographic research. From these perspectives, there arises, in my view, a substantial need to diversify the field of investigation. Anthropology, at the theoretical and epistemic level can contribute to the discourse on the applicability of the notion of civil society under the current conditions of global capitalism and conflicting views on the role of the state (withering, integralist or both). At an applied level, however, anthropology cannot lose sight of the reality that civil society is by no means an empty notion: it is a mass of practices and discourses through which locally born movements acquire self-awareness, often under conditions of extremely fluid formal-informal, individual-institutional, local-global interaction. In this perspective, the point is less about whether the state is the intruder (as Gellner and Hardt maintain) or the victim (as Hann suggests), but whether the strategies, language and ideals of the new civic movements are able to reconstruct a semantic relationship with the state.
Practices of civil society in post-socialist Eastern Europe
There are two conflicting views of the development of civic movements in post-socialist Europe. One suggests that a common feature of the transition processes of the Eastern European countries is that civil society is generally weak. The second argues that there is a dynamism, flexibility and richness to the civil society organisations and movements, although there are some differences between those in Eastern and Western European countries after 1989. These two positions are seemingly irreconcilable because they deal with the same problem but under different premises. The first assumes that to study the level of civic engagement in Eastern Europe means pursuing a comparative, often quantitative methodological perspective not only on this side of the continent, but more significantly on the other. The second, taking a prevalently qualitative approach, investigates similarities and dissimilarities between the movements, organisations and the like, which are considered products of the post-socialist transformation and the EU enlargement process. Hence, arguably, the two approaches could positively complement each other, as has been recently achieved in some of the studies reviewed below (see also Torsello 2008) . It is beyond the scope of this article to present a general and comprehensive introduction to the development of civil society in post-socialist Europe.
The first position, which denounces the weakness of civil society in Eastern Europe, has been put forward by, for instance, Howard's influential book (2003) . Howard deals with civil society conceived of as "a crucial part of the public space between the state and the family, and embodied in voluntary organizations" (2003, 1) . He begins his theoretical introduction by discerning between two analytical approaches to the study of post-socialist Europe: the first focussing on the new aspects of the transition in these regions, and introducing a more general comparative framework including, for instance, Latin American countries. The second, the legacies approach, begins from the idea that we cannot completely overlook the aspects that have been inherited from the socialist period, thus this approach actually focuses on what is different and what is new in the post-socialist experience. Howard's three case studies include Russia, Eastern and Western Germany, studied using three indicators: contemporary economic well-being, political institutions and civilisation. The term civilisation, which sounds immediately odd to an anthropologist, is used to refer to cultural factors, or, as Howard underlines it: "different cultural and religious civilizations" (2003, 4) . In spite of being against a cross-country analytical approach to civil society, in his book he often makes use of aggregate-level national data and quantitative indicators on world countries not included in his case studies. This is done by contrasting three groups: older democracies, post-authoritarian countries and post-communist countries. The results of his analysis indicate that the differences among post-communist countries are differences "in degree" and not "in kind" (2003, 70) and show that these countries scores much lower than countries in the other two categories (including South Africa, South Korea and most Latin American countries) and that differences among post-communist nations are minimal.
Howard constructs his argument on the basis of an initial critique of Hann's contribution. Although he agrees with Hann's point about the western-central bias of the commonly used notion of civil society, he rejects the possibility of enlarging the sphere of categories of civic involvement when dealing with Eastern Europe. This, in his view, would only lead to more confusion and to an excessive fragmentation of the empirical findings (2003, (48) (49) (50) . Thus, he suggests that the only productive way to map the actual participation of citizens in civil society and to avoid limiting the analysis to numbers of organisations is to make use of national survey data (such as the New Democracies Barometer, presently Eurobarometer, and World Value Survey). This data would enable the percentage of respondents who are members of civic organisations to be measured. His results are as follows: citizens in postsocialist countries maintain strong feelings of mistrust regarding voluntary organisations due to their experiences under communism; they continue to make use of friendship networks, which discourages the development of voluntary organisations; they feel generally disappointed with the current economic and political state of their countries, and this dissuades them from joining public organisations (2003, 148) . Their general quantitative findings, however, seem to prove the argument about weak civil societies. According to their research, only 18 per cent of citizens are actively involved in civic organisations, and the time spent weekly in associations is one-third of that in Western European countries. They explain the weakness paradigm using a number of case studies from the two countries and present the main factors as being a scarcity of resources and economic incentives: the lower general level of education among members, limited time available for association activities (also due to the need to engage in secondary economic practices to make ends meet), the "tension between goals in the future and a materialistic orientation about the present" (2004, 327) . One organisational reason for this weakness is in the nature of NGOs, which develop according to the availability of western funds, and hence are not motivated by real local social interests. Therefore, such organisations remain largely unattached to local society and so privilege small membership bases.
A more empirically and qualitatively solid study is provided by Anhaier et al. (2000) on the nature of Eastern German civic movements. The study investigates the development of a number of associations in different social fields and finds an intriguing paradox. On the one hand, a large number of these organisations developed as a consequence of large institutional transfer from Western German organisations (mainly in health and social services). On the other hand, Eastern Germany has also developed a large number of smaller civic organisations, rooted in the local area and usually characterised as having a comparatively narrow membership base. These later organisations operate mainly in areas which were prohibited or absent during socialist times: political organisations, recreational centres and environmental groups. Although the findings point to a similar West/East rate of membership per population (around 60-40 per cent), membership generally is almost half that in the East (26 per cent versus 50 per cent of the surveyed cases). The paradox of these two different types of civil society existing in parallel in Eastern Germany is resolved if we consider the normative role of the Federal state. Germany has a long tradition of state legal support according to a subsidiarity principle. According to this agreement, the state funds a number of locally based organisations, which cooperate with state institutions in the welfare and health sectors. This explains the proliferation of a dense network of large organisations based in the Western Ländern, which operates alongside or even within the state sector. On the other hand, the small associations which developed in other sectors do not receive state support, and can be identified as the true product of Eastern European civil society development. They have limited membership and activities, due to a lack of funding, and in a way they are more spontaneous.
This and a number of other empirical studies on civil society in Eastern Europe have pointed out the complexity of dealing comprehensively with the problem. One important conclusion seems to be that studying civil society in operation is a much more useful platform for making comparisons between these countries and with western European countries. If the application of western theoretical models is, to say the least, at odds with many of the social phenomena, movements, institutions and organizations, which have developed in this part of Europe since the 1990s, the notion of civil society is more justifiable in practice. This is because, as illustrated by some of these case studies, international organisations (sponsors and other civic organisations) actively seek to build up connections in order to counterbalance two important factors: the general public's low participation and concern for civic organisations and their activities, and the lack of independent and private funding. The interplay of these two factors alone points to a major difference, so far, between western and eastern civil societies at the operational level: the stronger degree of state dependency in the latter versus the former.
In what follows I will consider one example of the development of an environmental civic organization as part of a major urban transport amelioration project in Hungary, the Budapest Ring Road.
The Budapest Ring Road
The history of the ring road project is rather complex. The initial idea dates back to 1942, when Professor Vásárhelyi Boldizsár of the Technical University of Budapest envisaged the possibility of connecting the local roads leading to the capital by means of a ring road of much reduced length. Back in the 1960s, this idea was developed into a project inspired by the Paris model, which would connect an external highway with one of the major inner routes of Budapest-the Hungaria Út, a road with eight motor-lanes and a double tram-lane crossing the city in the Pest area. The project was abandoned in 1974 and the initial concept of a 'ring' rather than of a single central motorway was readopted. In 1982 the first section of the ring was launched, connecting the M1 and M5 motorways, but work began only in 1987. In 1998 the southern section of the ring was completed, including 29 km of highway (2x2 lanes, rather than the originally planned 3x3) ending in the conjunction of the M1, M7 and M5 motorways. In December 2005 the first part of the eastern section was completed, at the conjunction between trunk road no. 4 and the motorway. In 2006 the M0 Látogató Központ (M0 Visiting Centre) was established, presenting facts, figures and historical data on the ring road to the public. On September 2008 the Megyeri Bridge over the Danube was opened. This enormous project, whose cost exceeded €200 million, was the first step towards the debated completion of the missing M0 section, from the eastern end northwards to the planned M2. This 29 km road, conventionally known as the northern section, is the subject of this chapter's ethnographic investigation.
The cost of building the M0 is hard to assess presently. Nonetheless, a short historical comparison may help us understand how the budget for the project increased rapidly and steadily. In 2004, the European Investment Bank, which is involved in all TEN-T projects 1 posted the following about a section of the M0 on its website:
The project concerns the construction of 38.7 km of a new 2x2 motorway on the Budapest Ring-road M0 between trunk no.4 and motorway M3 (located to the southeast and east of Budapest). The southern sections of the bypass linking radial motorways M1, M7 and M5 and trunk road no.4 have already been completed or are in the process of being completed by using local funds. The proposed project would be supported as well by a significant Cohesion Funds contribution. The estimated cost was 500 million euro, with about 70 million of EIB financing. Two years later, the EIB announced that it would give Hungary a loan of €50 million to complete 26.5 km of the M0 eastern section.
3 According to the plan, the Hungarian government would provide approximately €100 million for the project. These figures, however, do not really correspond to others on the relative costs, particularly for the more expensive eastern sections. Other information shows that 39.2 km of the eastern section culminating at Megyeri Bridge have been completed using 85 per cent European funding (Cohesion Fund and Phare) and 15 per cent Hungarian money. The overall cost of this section, including the bridge, is estimated to be about 100 billion Hungarian forints (€370 million), which is a little less than the declared overall cost of the project. How can we explain these differences? First, providing a rough estimate of the overall project is highly unrealistic, since it has expanded over the years compared to initial plans. One example is the addition of the M31 section, which adds a 12 km "shortcut" between the M0 and M3 around the town of Gödöllo and was completed in 2009 at the cost of €45 million. Second, the cost of each section varies according to the terrain, whether there are any river-crossing sections etc., as well as the actual cost of the land. The missing northern sections are deemed to be particularly expensive due to the hilly ground and unfavourable climatic conditions such as strong winds, fog and heavy winter snowstorms.
Civil opposition
There are a number of reasons justifying local opposition to the motorway project. These include the environmental impact of the road-plans are for the northern section to cross naturally protected areas, part of which come under the Natura 2000 agreement 4 , areas rich in water and thermal springs, as well as regions that have traditionally constituted the "fresh lungs" of Budapest, conveying cool and clean winds towards the polluted capital.
The second involves the economic impact, particularly in relation to the cost of land. On the one hand, speculation has occurred in the areas where the motorway will be constructed; on the other hand, an increasing number of former city inhabitants seeking to move to a cleaner and greener environment have recently purchased and inhabited building plots, and these have recently been losing value due to the imminent road expansion.
The third reason for opposition concerns political issues and is a reflection of the complex process of road planning and building, where the interlinking of interests (of an economic and political nature) often juxtaposes local governments against their national counterparts. All these factors make the M0 a thorny issue which, judging by the wide media coverage and the diversified opposition of the civic organisations involved, is far from being settled (Torsello 2012) .
The first opposition was conceived in a settlement called Káposztásmegyer. The original plans for the northern section of the M0, including the environmental impact assessment, were prepared in June 1994. This planned route connected the M3 motorway (from Miskolc in Eastern Hungary) with trunk road no. 11 (coming from the North, on the western side of the Danube). According to this plan, the M0 would pass through an almost uninhabited area near the M3, then connect with the new M2 main road, which the EIB is also funding as part of the loan. From there, the road would have passed over a 16 metre high, 270 metre long viaduct, within 250-300 metres of a housing estate, called Káposztásmegyer II, where 5000 inhabitants live.Furthermore, Junction 2, connecting the new M0 to a major arterial in the direction of central Budapest, was planned to be built within 150 metres of a nursery school and within 400 metres of apartment buildings. This would transfer the traffic backing up on two-lane roads feeding into a junction that is only 15 metres from the apartment buildings, and runs between the local school, the nursery, and the private apartments. According to studies commissioned by local NGOs, the dust and pollution particles generated by the increased traffic on the road would be 25-30 per cent above Hungarian environmental standards.
The construction of the first section of the northern ring started in spring 1998. Local residents learned about the project only after machinery and materials began to be stored close to their houses. It was at that point that a specific opposition initiative emerged. The first was the creation of the Káposztásmegyer Environmental Protection Society (KKK) with the main aim of individuating illegal procedures in the environmental impact assessment and subsequently increasing public awareness of the project. In June 1999, working with the largest Hungarian environmental NGO, the Clean Air Group (CAG), they were able to bring a lawsuit against the State Motorway Management Company (SMMC) forcing them to suspend work for a few months. Subsequently, the Supreme Court accepted an SMMC request to restart work and in 2000 the section was completed, the only modification being the elimination of an arterial which would have crossed the housing estate. KKK and CAG also requested an investigation to determine whether the EIB was responsible for the project in late 1998, but the response was that the EIB could not be held responsible for national legal cases. At this point, the two NGOs contacted the EU ombudsman (this was the first case involving a country outside the EU). A ping-pong match ensued between the ombudsman and the EIB presidency which, on several occasions, refused to provide the documentation requested by the ombudsman and decided not to proceed in funding the northern section, with the exception of the bypass sections. Finally, in 2001 the ombudsman could find no irregularity in the conduct of the EIB but warned that environmental procedures must be respected when allocating loans for structural development projects. According to the two NGOs this gave further support to the idea that the legal procedures of the Environmental Impact Assessment had not been followed properly.
It is interesting to note that in this case the diversification of the protest and the ability of environmental activists to take a firm political stance, until then almost unknown to Central Eastern Europe, have attracted the attention of economists and political scientists (Peters 2005; Tarrow and Petrova 2006) . These articles recognise the forerunner status of the environmental activist opposition, as this is considered the first such case in postsocialist Europe. In this respect, Peters (2005) underlines how the protest constituted an original contribution to Eastern European environmentalism, since it clearly showed how the political boundaries of intervention could be redefined according to the priorities set by civic organisations. What, in his view, was striking in this protest was the ability of the environmental organisations to extend the scope of their action even though they did not have the institutional arrangements to do so. The appeal to the EU ombudsman is a peculiar case of intervention outside the EU sphere, and can be interpreted as a case of trespassing on national competences. Even though the ombudsman communicated with the EIB and not directly with the Hungarian government bodies involved (the Ministry of Transport, Development and Environment), it set the case for a redefinition of the role of the EIB and hence affected the subsequent process of obtaining structural funding for the Hungarian state (Peters 2005, 13-14) . Tarrow and Petrova (2006) , on the other hand, are interested in situating the M0 protest within the general picture of weak civil society in Eastern Europe. Following some of the main events of the protest, they conclude that the "transactionism" demonstrated by these movements is unique within the Eastern European picture. By transactionism they mean the tendency of civic organisations to engage in mutual relations and connections rather than seek the open participation of the general public, which is still seen as problematic. Their conclusion on the comparative strength of Eastern European civic movements is even more blunt: apparently less free of institutional constraints and less subject to popular accountability, they may work successfully, as the Budapest case indicated. This is also because a transactional style of politics is similarly widespread among political elites (Tarrow and Petrova 2006, 15) .
What makes these cases worthy of investigation beyond a common-sense "nimby" approach is that they originated in conditions where civil society was deemed to be weak, and they were framed within often poorly accountable styles of policy-making. Thus, unaccountability, a lack of transparency and technical deficiencies (both real and claimed) are key elements to be analysed when trying to understand the real socio-political values of these movements. However, the two positions described above fail to see beyond the often stereotyped perspective that western scholars adopt when dealing with civic movements in Eastern Europe. In other words, what these approaches lack is a grasp of the ground-level strategies and meanings that activists and those who participated in the protest attribute to it. This can be best achieved through attention to discourses and practices and to their transformation in the more than a decade long protest. I will now introduce the second case of environmental protest concerning the M0 project, relating to the northern-most section, which I conducted fieldwork research on in order to shed further light on the issue.
Dispute over the northern section
While the struggle against the first section of the northern ring paled into the background the moment the new Danube bridge was completed, the second section is still ongoing. According to the initial project, this section was to complete the ring connecting the junction points of trunk roads 10 and 11, in the north eastern part of the city. There are two main arguments in support of constructing the road. The first is that roads 10 and 11 are extremely congested two-lane routes which connect Budapest with some of the nearby tourist and historical spots in the region of Szentendre and Esztergom, along the curve of the Danube. This area, apart from being rich in thermal and open-air campsites, includes one area of the natural reserve, Natura 2000. Besides tourism, however, in the last five or six years the immediate north eastern outskirts of the capital have become a privileged residential destination for relatively rich urban dwellers looking for larger plots to build homes near the city, yet within a natural environment. This trend, visible in the ever growing number of buildings (during socialism weekend houses, now large two-storey family homes) dotting the Buda hills, has attracted media attention in the last few years, particularly because daily traffic to and from the capital has dramatically increased. Thus, having a section of the over 100 km long ring road in the vicinity is not an unattractive proposition for many daily commuters.
The second argument, of an economic nature, concerns the re-evaluation of the area. The municipalities in the north eastern section of the planned ring road have limited infrastructure and local businesses. In spite of the incoming number of city dwellers who are expanding the population in many of these villages, there is a strong contrast between run-down and even non-existent paved roads in the historical nuclei of these villages and the more recent expansion, where luxurious houses stand proudly. Furthermore, the number of local businesses is very small, apart from a handful of shops, car service points and other minor small factories, the region has never been considered in economic planning due to its natural limitations. Even in the 1970s the Buda hills were celebrated as the "lungs of the capital", and thanks to the strong northern winds blowing throughout the winter season and later in spring, they were an ideal place to escape the pollution and chaos of the city. Thus, economic development has been used rhetorically to justifying transport improvements in the region.
In spite of these two arguments, the conception of the second northern section has long remained alien to most local municipalities. Since 1996 all the municipalities to be affected by the section have opposed the project. Unlike in the case of the first section, resistance and protest has proved, over the years, to be less organised and harmonised. True, by the end of the 1990s, each village and municipality had its own civic organization (or even more than one) which formally joined forces with the others to oppose the project. However, unlike in Káposztásmegyer, few initiatives shared a common basis on which to participate, it was as if they chose to remain locked in their own towers rather than unite and fight together. One of the leaders of a local civic organisation reasoned that the problem was the concomitance of different interests which, in a number of municipalities (see below), constituted a strong obstacle to protest.
The environmental protest concerning the northern section started around the mid-1990s. As mentioned above, by 1996 all the communities affected by the project had developed their own civic movements, which in the early stages more or less cooperated by adhering strictly to a common goal. These were: Piliscsabáért Egyesület, Solymári Környezetvedő Egyesülete, SOS Békásmegyerért Egyesület, Van jobb M0 Ürömiek Egyesülete, Ne M0 Pilisborosjenőjek Egyesülete and Zöld Gömb Egyesület. At this stage all these organisations were in line with the directives of the local governments that in principle opposed the construction of the ring road section. In the early phases of the project, this gave strong public legitimacy to the protest. The following are two of the movements that I have studied more closely: Van jobb M0 Ürömiek Egyesülete and SOS Békásmegyerért Egyesület.
Van jobb M0 Ürömiek Egyesülete was founded in 1994 in conjunction with the civic association of the neighbouring community Ne M0 Pilisborosjenő. The two villages, with populations of about 5500 and 3400 inhabitants respectively, were the forerunners of the protest in the northern section. Towards the end of the 1990s together they had over 3000 members, who became particularly active when the general plans became public for building the motorway across a 16 m high bridge on territory affecting both villages. This was at a time when the local population was particularly sensitive towards the environmental issue. Public meetings were organised regularly and, according to the founding members, they were always extremely crowded. The strength of the two movements, which deliberately used "M0" in their names, was initially due to their success in involving local politicians, such as mayors and counsellors. Moreover, the fact that the meetings, to which both local authorities and inhabitants were invited, took place on the premises of the municipal offices and cultural halls gave these events an element of formal confrontation. The presence of the two mayors, who regularly attended but did not adopt an open position in line with the protest, was itself a sign of assurance that the movement was not a temporary gesture of dissidence.
In the ensuing years signatures were gathered for two petitions in both communities with a total of 1600 signatures each; at the same time publicly presented studies on the impact of noise and mainly air pollution from the road had a strong effect on raising public awareness. Another issue that raised public concern was speculation over the purchase of land which, in the neighbouring community of Solymár, had already alerted the protesters to the fact that action was needed if they wanted to influence political and economic decision-making processes. This problem became increasingly manifest in the years to come as agricultural fields were converted into brown sites, and projects for commercial and logistics centres were made public.
After 2003, the strength of the movements began to decline. The mayors of the two communities, who had never been openly in favour of the road, and had taken part in the meetings of the local organisations, changed their attitudes. Formal decisions regarding the northern section followed shortly and the protesters felt increasingly frustrated by the poor outcomes of their efforts. This caused a general disinterest in the movement, especially in the second half of the 2000s. Some internal factors had occurred alongside this development. First, in the last ten years the two communities, and particularly Pilisborosjenő, were the target of large housing developments, which brought in a number of new residents, from the city, mainly of high economic and social status (private entrepreneurs, businessmen and professionals). These newcomers, who had their luxury houses built in brand new quarters of the villages, developed strong horizontal ties among themselves, but less frequently with the original residents. It is not simply a matter of coincidence that as the status gap between the rich newcomers and the local inhabitants became increasingly manifest, the protest lost general visibility. It was clear that the newcomers were far less sensitive to the environment than the local population, and were strongly in favour of the road for personal interests, i.e. their need to commute daily to work in the city, given that very few of them use public transport.
Second, the initial strength of the two movements declined when cooperation and communication became less smooth and eventually problematic. This, according to local active members, was caused by the efforts by the state and city government to complete the M0 in sections, and not as an integrated project, as the TEN-T framework had foreseen. The idea of a common project to be communicated to all the interested municipalities was never presented by the political authorities, according to informants. Because of this local environmental groups were unable to establish a common platform for action, and were forced to intervene in a fragmented and uncoordinated manner. Each municipality and each civic organisation became concerned with the particular section of the project which was most important to it. This weakened the general protest (unlike in the Czech and Italian cases) and eventually had the rather perverse outcome of bringing the communities into conflict over the possible variants, once the completion of the ring road was officially announced. There was a significant difference in terms of the degree of infrastructural investment in the areas of interest: the road had to transverse Pilisborosjenő and Üröm by means of a bridge or tunnels, whereas, for instance Solymár, which is situated on higher land, was connected to the national roads at a large junction, which provided space for the creation of shopping and logistics facilities. When the opposition in Solymár began to languish, thanks also to prevailing economic interests, this was interpreted as a sign of general weakness in the movement by activists from other communities. Moreover, the solutions, involving each environmental organisation providing an alternative in response to the different development stages of the project, could not be mutually harmonised, since there was no common plan to work from. Therefore, at a later stage, after 2004, each time the local movements intervened, they could be accused of threatening the interests of the neighbouring municipalities.
Upon inquiring as to the reasons for the lack of coordination among movements, I did not receive a precise answer. Some of the leaders pointed out that local political decisions had made it difficult to create common grounds for protest. In Üröm, the municipal administration had promised to directly intervene and support the tunnel over the bridge option, and this was interpreted positively by the local inhabitants. When the tunnel was chosen, reasons for protesting seemed to vanish, since the two local organisations saw this option as the "less harmful" of the possible choices. However, such optimism did not correspond to general concerns about the northern section, that remained strong in other communities, such as Békásmegyer, which, through the help of national environmental NGOs (particularly the Clean Air Group), as well as global organisations such as CEE Bankwatch, continued to denounce the dangers of drilling in the region, which is the largest provider of spring water to the country.
The case of SOS Békásmegyerért Egyesület is even more telling of the difficulties encountered by the movements when facing changes in local power configurations. The organisation was founded in 1998 and its leader was able, with the help of other enthusiastic founders, to organise a public meeting in the town hall, attracting several thousand inhabitants. This movement is special because of the different political conditions to which it is subject: Békásmegyer, with a population of over 40,000, belongs to the Third District of the capital, with which it was merged in 1950. During the 1970s it underwent a large demographic increase, growing as a suburb of Buda district, with over 13,000 pre-fab blocks of flats built towards the end of socialism. There is still a clear distinction between the original village (Ófalu), with fewer inhabitants, and the new section, highly urbanised in character. This centre is also connected to the city by rail, and thus far this has garnered much consent for the protest against the new road. On the other hand, in this case decisions at the political level depend on the city government and thus this leaves comparatively less space for autonomous local action.
A second distinctive trait of this civic organisation relates to one of its founding leaders. He is a retired civil servant who still has a good number of personal connections with city politicians. During the decade-long protest he was able to arrange several personal meetings with them, including the new mayor of Budapest, who is also the ex mayor of the Third District. During these meetings it emerged that the city had decided to go on with the project, particularly once the Megyeri bridge had been completed. However, the movement, through its leader, still hopes to achieve a better deal in terms of the options proposed.
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Third, the comparative strength of the protest in Békásmegyer depends also on the limited benefits that the project might bring to the local community. Unlike in the villages described above, where the environmental impact is stronger, but not directly and immediately felt by the inhabitants, here the local population fears an increase in noise, traffic and air pollution, as this became immediately apparent after the construction of the Megyeri Bridge. However, no further infrastructural investment is expected in Békásmegyer, which is already saturated by the sudden demographic expansion of the last three decades.
Also in the case of SOS Békásmegyer, the first years of the movement were marked by a strong degree of public participation which, as mentioned, has not yet significantly decreased as was the case with the other two movements presented above. Petitions and public demonstrations were organised, and until 2008 local political support was constant. On one occasion, the movement succeeded in collecting over 1400 signatures for a petition urging that a lawsuit be filed if the planned road were to cause harm (directly and indirectly) to local dwellers. Also, simulations of the noise and air pollution the road would create have been publicly presented to the local population to strong response.
There has been some coordination with other movements, particularly in the early years when there was a degree of common organisation (over petitions, for instance), but when the standpoints of some of the municipalities in the hilly regions changed, SOS Békásmegyer stopped communication. This has been interpreted negatively by members of other movements, since it confirmed the suspicion that each organisation sought to "benefit" in its own way or reduce its losses from the project. Békásmegyer's movement leaders, however, stated there has been a general apathy towards the protest since 2009, after the opening of the Megyeri bridge, and responsibility for this partly lies in the decreased activity of the civic movements, and partly in the increased economic opportunities available to different sets of actors.
In an intriguing case, in Bekásmegyer, the activists denounced the "underground" activity of the local district council, which using personal connections with the city council has allegedly supported "alternative" forms of civil society in open opposition to the anti-ring road movement. This is a new and peculiar situation, in which civil society has become instrumental in the consolidation of power of local governments and in maintaining profitable cooperation channels with the state.
According to local activists, local government officials would have given full support to the creation of at least two civic organisations that were in favour of the ring road. They have their own home pages and in recent times (since 2009) they have scheduled public meetings to explain their support for the ring road. In March 2011, I attended one of these meetings, whose title was unequivocal: "The M0 and Bekásmegyer, opportunities and directions". The meeting was very informal, with a dozen participants and four activists taking the lead, but it was held in the premises of the town's cultural hall. I arrived five minutes after it began and as I took my seat I heard that the discussion on the ring road, the only topic of the evening according to the agenda, was concluded after exactly six minutes of discussion. What followed was a conversation about funding opportunities for the association, future projects of an environmental nature, problems with the sewage system, waste collection, and so forth. In several cases some of the participants urged for better "connectivity" with the city mayor and the council so that the range of projects could be expanded. In these circumstances one of the leaders of the organisation reassured the meeting that he would continue in his efforts to re-approach the mayor, as he claimed he had been doing all along. My feeling was that this was more of a business meeting, or at least an internal meeting for the association, and it was surprising that the M0 theme was not touched upon at all, in spite of the programme.
Although I was unable to obtain more precise information on this issue, the results of my participant observation, the vagueness with which these activists treated or responded to the ring road issue, and their manifest intention to lobby the city council all suggested to me that this was a rather different form of civil society. One of the leaders of SOS Bekásmegyer told me that these new organisations, originating whilst work was ongoing at the Megyeri Bridge, eventually communicated with Brussels to establish a sort of counter-movement to support the more rapid completion of the M0. I have not been able to access documents which prove the actual communication between these movements and the EU authorities, and therefore these findingremain unverifiedHowever, the very fact that these new movements do not oppose the road project, given that they are environmental movements, makes for an intriguing case in which civil society is no longer a space between kinship, households and the state, as in the anthropological literature discussed above, but a new and constantly changing arena of political action.
Conclusion
The M0 ring road in Budapest is a complex case in which the interplay of different economic and political factors and the strategies pursued by the sets of actors call for an attentive analysis of its significance at local and translocal levels. One of the main features of this case is its large spatial span, including the different typologies of political institutions. This is what makes it difficult to understand and wholly grasp the local dynamics of power. The same is true for the environmental movements, which originated in the different areas affected by the plan, and that have undergone different developmental phases according to the needs of the protest and the implementation of the transport project.
The main difficulty that civic organisations have confronted in this case has been the fragmentation of their responses to intrusive structural development policies. Although the movement has consolidated genuinely strong forms of civic protest, as in the cases of Káposztásmegyer, Bekásmegyer and the other communities of the Pilis region, it has been limited by the duration of the project. Not only have the multiple agents of the movement been unable to coordinate common action, but they have also dealt with different degrees of public involvement, interest and even legitimacy relating to their activities. This can be interpreted as a general consequence of the conflicting interplay of political (as well as economic) interests between state and local governments.
However, civil society is here not simply to influence the outcome of local and translocal political choices. The genuine thrust from below has had to deal with some of the limitations of establishing participative forms of political action from below in Central Eastern Europe. The choice made by all these movements to maintain an adequate balance of formal and informal strategies, and to "delegate" the coordination role to national organisations has proved successful in the short-run, but less so in the long-run. Before drawing easy conclusions on the revival of civil society as true movements from below under the conditions marking the end of post-socialism, it is perhaps safer to consider that these movements, in the particular field of environmentalism, are bred by the political and economic dynamics of the enlargement scheme developed in Brussels. What is new in this form of civil society is that it brings together different arenas of political action, in which responses from below are confronted with the need to provide answers and give meaning to the protest against development projects that increasingly take shape outside the traditional locus to which they belonged, i.e. the state.
